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The purpose of this MBA Professional Report is to study the current state of 
expeditionary logistical support in the Navy and to identify logistical challenges faced in 
expeditionary environments. Expeditionary supply chain or logistics refers to the 
activities and capabilities needed to provide operational units in an expeditionary 
environment with services and supplies such as fuel, food, water, ammunition, etc. An 
expeditionary supply chain also includes responsibilities such as establishment of ports of 
embarkation and debarkation, container management, financial management, and 
inventory and distribution management. 
Two hypothetical case studies illustrating the current logistic challenges facing 
the Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Naval Special Warfare communities are presented 
in this report. Strategic management and supply chain management theories and 
techniques are used to analyze these challenges and to provide specific recommendations 
for areas of improvement. This study then identifies opportunities for further study 
concerning the Naval Logistics Support System for Expeditionary Forces. 
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The aim of the Navy’s warfighting capability has long been to win wars at sea. In 
recent decades, however, the U.S. has engaged in conflicts that involved countering 
threats from non-traditional actors. These conflicts were conducted on inland battlefields 
against non-state actors or insurgency movements, both of which employed terrorism and 
terrorist techniques to disrupt coalition foreign policy and nation building efforts (Farmer, 
2011). America’s powerful maritime force could not directly counter these opponents. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effort required the Navy to play a direct supporting 
role through its expeditionary warfare and Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW) 
capabilities. While the Navy’s primary focus will remain on its maritime capabilities, the 
trend described above is expected to continue in the foreseeable future and the Navy’s 
role in these efforts is likely to endure (Department of Defense, 2014). 
Coincident with this new demand for expeditionary warfighting capability is an 
increasing fiscal burden placed upon the nation’s finances. Accompanying this is political 
pressure among the nation’s lawmakers to resolve the problem through the passage of 
balanced budgets and the restoration of sustainable fiscal policy. In 2013, this fiscal and 
political atmosphere and the inability of lawmakers to agree on targeted budget cuts 
resulted in across-the-board cuts to discretionary spending of all Federal departments. 
The DOD was not exempted. The indiscriminate nature of these cuts has been frequently 
criticized as a crude and inappropriate technique. The effect is that costs are reduced 
without regard to the corresponding programs’ benefits or the consequences that could 
result from their elimination (Feickert, 2013). The counterargument these critics 
(Feickert, 2013) make is that cuts should be targeted thoughtfully to those areas that will 
yield the greatest benefit to the taxpayer and at the least cost; however, to do this 
effectively, these areas must be identified. This research seeks to assist in this 
identification by addressing the following questions. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study was initiated by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) in response to a 
perceived lack of academic research in the area of Navy Expeditionary Logistics 
(EXLOG). The results of the literature review conducted in the course of this report 
largely confirmed that perception. The review found there was previous research 
performed in the area of EXLOG; however, the academic works are relatively few in 
number and are limited in scope (Tessier, Nilsen, Lugo, & Perez, 2004; Applegate, 
2006). The primary purpose of those research reports was to examine and report upon a 
particular problem or incident. The findings were informative. Whether taken 
individually or collectively, however, the prior research reports were unable to provide 
the comprehensive understanding of EXLOG that is the goal of the ONR initiative. If the 
Navy is to continue to be a relevant contributor on the main fronts of the nation’s Global 
War on Terror, the authors of this study believe that understanding EXLOG and carrying 
it out in an efficient and effective manner are vital. 
This research project therefore intends to define, answer, and/or clarify questions 
such as: 
 What are the role and responsibilities of the Expeditionary Support Units? 
 What is the current state of Expeditionary Logistics Processes? 
 What are the Supply chain and Logistical processes currently being used 
in expeditionary environments? 
 What are some of the logistical challenges being faced in the current 
expeditionary environment? 
 What recommendations can be made for improving Expeditionary 
Logistics Processes? 
C. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
This report is intended to serve both as a stand-alone report on the logistics 
support operations of the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Naval Special 
 3
Warfare (NSW) communities and, also, as one of a series of studies examining various 
aspects of the operation of Navy and Marine expeditionary logistics. 
This is to be the first of a series of several similar reports coordinated by the ONR 
to study the operations of Navy and Marine expeditionary units. Individually, the aim of 
each of these reports will be similar to this one: to provide a critical assessment of the 
logistics business practices in a particular community (or communities) and to provide 
lessons learned and recommendations for ways these areas may be improved and made 
more cost effective. 
1. Purpose 
When read as an independent work, this study can be viewed as a critical 
assessment of the logistics business practices in the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) and Naval Special Warfare (NSW) communities. 
When viewed in the context of a series of reports, this report is intended to 
contribute to the formation of a composite picture of the operation of EXLOG operations 
as a whole. This integrated understanding will enable a comprehensive understanding of 
the range of EXLOG logistics business practices being employed. It will also permit a 
critical, comparative assessment of these practices with the goal of identifying areas of 
improvement and potential cost savings. The benefit of integrating these various reports 
is the perspective gained. This will also enable an informed comparison of the 
communities concerned that could yield additional cost savings through potential 
standardization across communities. 
2. Benefits and Limitations 
Because of the long-standing focus on a traditional maritime naval force, it is 
hardly surprising the majority of academic inquiries are directed towards the Navy’s core 
competencies; while relatively little research has been directed toward EXLOG 
(Applegate, 2006; Tessier et al., 2004). While this may have been acceptable in the past, 
a number of factors make the study of EXLOG an important area of current research. In 
the coming decades, it will yield benefits for the nation. 
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This report will identify and discuss a number of factors that currently contribute 
to the sub-optimization of EXLOG operations. The leadership and personnel of this 
community have, however been successful in achieving their mission. This success, in 
conjunction with a lack of readily available cost and logistics information, may have 
created an inaccurate, optimistic picture of the effectiveness of the cutbacks which have 
been implemented thus far. Without the ability to clearly communicate what impact the 
cutbacks have had, and to accurately and systematically report opportunity costs, 
tradeoffs, and secondary effects, the EXLOG community has become a victim of its own 
success. 
This research is important to the Navy and to the nation because of the potential 
to realize financial efficiencies and operational effectiveness through standardization of 
business practices and the optimization of supply chains and inventory management 
systems. Our research indicated that EOD Logistics Support Units and NSW Logistical 
supports have no single standard inventory management system. Both units have 
employed ad hoc methods to manage their inventories; EOD relies on a stand-alone 
commercial off-the-shelf inventory management system to manage its warehouse; 
whereas, NSW uses multiple systems to do the same. Unfortunately, the individual 
systems are not compatible (EODESU1, 2014). While more detailed analysis is required, 
it is likely that each system’s readiness capability comes through the accumulation and 
retention of redundant spare parts and pieces of equipment (EODESU1, 2014). These 
buffers are necessary to ensure readiness. They also represent the symptoms of an 
unresponsive supply chain: lack of inventory management training, heavy use of non-
standard requisition processes, and loss of accountability. They also represent significant 
financial investments that might be eliminated through an improved inventory 
management system (EODESU1, 2014). This is one of the main areas of potential 
improvement that we discovered and which we will describe in our report. The potential 
for cost savings, however, exists in many other areas of the EXLOG community. 
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3. Methodology 
The information that served as the basis of this report was gathered from key 
personnel during face-to-face interviews at the logistics support commands for NSW and 
EOD as well as phone conversations and email exchanges. These individuals included 
senior personnel: commanding officers and their deputies and civilian and military 
subject matter experts. The information and perspective gained during the course of these 
interviews is presented in the form of two hypothetical yet realistic case studies. These 
case studies summarize and present the business operations of the units using a 
hypothetical scenario and fictionalized personnel, equipment, and data. The purpose of 
using this case study approach is to illustrate the processes in a succinct narrative format 
that will make the logistics processes more intuitively understandable while making their 
strengths and weaknesses more readily apparent. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
There have been previous research projects which have focused on expeditionary 
logistics. Our research team reviewed prior research reports in order to understand 
material that was applicable to this study’s research. Our team built upon their findings 
where possible and avoided duplicate efforts when practical. For the most part, the team 
judged these reports to be applicable and their findings valuable for this study’s research. 
These reports and their findings will be summarized along with an analysis of why their 
findings may or may not be applicable to this current research effort. 
The reports which were reviewed in preparation for this report did not have 
EXLOG as the sole area of concern; rather, they focused on varied but more limited areas 
of operation. For example, one research focused on the assessment of the spectrum—the 
largest expeditionary logistics within a single AOR (Tessier et al., 2004). At the opposite 
end, another report (Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics, 1999) focused on  
the newly established model for the Marines Corps—Operational Maneuver from the  
Sea (OMFTS). These reports, however, did yield valuable insights into their selected 
areas of research. It was noted that although there was little overlap between these  
areas, there were many common themes running through their analyses, findings, and 
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recommendations. This implicitly suggested the same goal as that of the overarching 
ONR research project which this research team believes may reveal similar common 
themes and lead to significant efficiencies and cost savings. 
The most comprehensive study was conducted by the National Research Council 
(NRC) to “determine the technological requirements, operational changes, and combat 
service support structure necessary to land and support forces ashore under the newly 
evolving Navy and Marine Corps doctrine” (Committee on Naval Expeditionary 
Logistics, 1999). The NRC appointed The Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics 
(CNEL) and gave it a threefold mission (Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics, 
1999): 
(1) Evaluate the packaging, sealift, and distribution network; and identify 
critical nodes and operations that affect timely insertion of fuels, 
ammunition, water, medical supplies, food, vehicles, and maintenance 
parts and tool blocks; 
(2) Determine specific changes required to relieve these critical nodes and 
support forces ashore, from assault through follow-on echelons; and  
(3) Present implementable changes to existing support systems; and 
suggest the development of innovative new systems and technologies to 
land and sustain dispersed units from the shoreline to 200 miles inland. 
(p. vii) 
At the time the stated study was conducted, OMFTS was a relatively new doctrine 
the Marine Corps had implemented. This was intended to overhaul the methods by which 
Marine Corps conducted logistics and other expeditionary functions by leveraging sea-
lanes to its advantage; then subsequently deploying Naval expeditionary forces and fire 
power directly from the sea to missions up to 400 miles inland (Committee on Naval 
Expeditionary Logistics, 1999). Because the doctrine was newly implemented, however, 
one of the first conclusions the CNEL reached was that OMFTS was not well established 
enough to enable them to answer their questions. Consequently, the committee 
recommendations included focusing on core logistical functions of force deployment, 
sustainment, medical support, or any basic logistical issue related to these core functions. 
The CNEL report provides many recommendations. These are in line with its 
focus on OMFTS and expeditionary logistics as specifically conducted by the Marine 
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Corps. Because of the specific nature of the report’s focus, many of these 
recommendations are not germane to the scope of this report. Several recommendations, 
however, do suggest the possibility that the alignment of expeditionary logistics 
procedures exists and the overarching ONR research project may yield further insight and 
potential cost savings through logistics efficiencies. Some of these recommendations 
include (Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics, 1999): 
 The Navy and Marine Corps should work together to craft a common 
approach to the resupply of all naval forces at sea. (p. 9) 
 The Navy and Marine Corps should create an end-to-end, OMFTS 
logistics concept that supports the concept of operations at each stage in 
the iterative process of defining future forces and their capabilities. (p. 10) 
 The Navy and Marine Corps, using an iterative, strategic planning process, 
should create an OMFTS concept of operations that integrates tactical and 
logistical considerations. (p. 24) 
Another report entitled “Logistics Support of Naval Expeditionary Units” was 
based on a study that evaluated NAVCENT logistical systems. It was conducted by four 
graduate students at the Naval Postgraduate School. The report focused on the supportive 
roles performed by naval expeditionary units (i.e., Naval Construction Forces (NCF), 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units, and 
Fleet Hospitals). It evaluated the adequacy and efficiency with which theater logistics 
capabilities were able to satisfy the requirements of the expeditionary units (Tessier et al., 
2004). A key finding of the report was that the NAVCENT logistical systems were 
“adequate, but inefficient” (Tessier et al., 2004) of operation, but the inefficiencies were 
due to lack of procedural compliance. Further conclusions pointed out the importance for 
expeditionary forces to have practical experience of typical logistical systems used within 
the geographical AOR. It was also deemed important that, prior to entering geographical 
theater, the expeditionary forces familiarize themselves with the organizations and 
structures of in-theater logistics systems’ and authorities’ and responsibilities (Tessier et 
al., 2004). 
The third report entitled “Naval Expeditionary Logistics: A Handbook for 
Complementing and Supporting Land Forces” was prepared by another NPS student 
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(Applegate, 2006). This project provided many recommendations, but its main product 
was the creation of a remarkably comprehensive “how-to” procedure for U.S. Navy 
logisticians who belong to, or who support, U.S. naval expeditionary forces (Applegate, 
2006). The report explored how the Navy had historically highlighted traditional 
warfighting platforms, but, in the same manner as traditional Navy units, had looked 
away from expeditionary combat forces. The report found that a lack of essential 
guidance for, or experience in, a joint environment prevented the understanding and 
implementation for expeditionary logistics procedures. Each community adopted its own 
perception and methodology in preparation and deployment support. This fostered an 
environment with multiple meanings for the same objectives. It also highlighted the need 
for uniformity of doctrine and procedure within the expeditionary communities and that 
they would operate within similar guidelines (Applegate, 2006). These and further 
training recommendations reflected those made by the previous team with regard to the 
CENTCOM AOR. These suggested the possibility that improvements may be realized in 
this area through standardization across communities. 
Ultimately, each research project sought out and defined an aspect of the 
expeditionary logistic spectrum in terms of identifying the need for either improvement in 
the process for logistical support or of creating a “how to” guide to understand the unique 
logistics requirements of expeditionary forces. The focus of this paper’s present research 
project will build upon this body of knowledge and explore within specific commands 
that make up NECC and NSW. With understanding the need to conduct and sustain 
military actions beyond the capability of conventional military forces, this research 
project intends to further explore the meaning of Expeditionary Logistics from a naval 
perspective. Within the financial budget process, it will point out how both EOD and 
NSW units are funded and how in some ways they are better funded compared to 
traditional naval forces. This is due to the nature of their missions. Compared to previous 





II. NAVY EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 
U.S. Navy Expeditionary Forces are comprised of two commands: Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) and Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW). 
Established in January 2006, NECC is an Echelon III command under U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command (USFFC). NSW was commissioned in 1987 and falls under U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM). 
A. NAVY EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT COMMAND 
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command’s (NECC) primary mission is to 
provide combat ready units for expeditionary missions to the Joint Coalition Force 
Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Navy Unified Combatant Command 
(COCOM). NECC’s forces operate in a wide range of maritime environments. This 
includes the littoral and inland zones such as harbors, inland waterways, ports, and rivers. 
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) serves as the single functional 
command for the Navy’s expeditionary forces. It also serves as central management for 
the readiness, resources, manning, training, and equipping of those forces. Expeditionary 
forces are organized to accomplish specific objectives in other countries (NECC, 2014). 
1. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Capabilities 
NECC is comprised of ten subordinate commands (see Figure 1) that provide 
twelve unique capabilities that support U.S. and allied expeditionary forces in various 
missions inland and at sea. These capabilities were created based on post 9/11 threats to 
U.S. national security. These capabilities are: Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces, 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Expeditionary Engineering and Construction, Mobile 
Diving and Salvage, Expeditionary Logistics, Riparian Forces, Maritime Civil Affairs, 
Expeditionary Combat Readiness and Training, Combat Camera, Expeditionary 
Intelligence, and Guard Battalion and Individual Augmentee Preparedness (NKO, 2014). 
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Figure 1.  NECC Subordinate Command (from NKO, 2014). 
NECC falls under U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC). NECC’s Subcommand 
capabilities allow it to be a versatile force ready to meet the challenges of its operational 
environments. Brief descriptions and the capabilities of NECC’s ten subordinate 
commands are shown in Figure 1, whereas the relative sizes of subordinate commands, as 
percentage of total size of NECC, are shown in Figure 2. As of 2014, the total number of 
personnel in NECC is approximately 29,000 (NKO, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2.  NECC Force Breakdown (from NKO, 2014). 
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a. Riverine 
Coastal Riverine Forces comprise 2.4% (Figure 2) of the total NECC. The 
primary focus for Coastal Riverine Forces force is to establish and maintain control of 
rivers, harbors, ports, and coastal waterways. They are also capable of combating sea-
based terrorism and various other illegal activities such as transporting components of 
weapons of mass destruction, hijacking, piracy, and human trafficking (NECC, 2014; 
NKO, 2014). 
b. Naval Construction 
Naval Construction personnel are also known as Seabees and constitute the 
majority of NECC forces with 49.8% (Figure 2) of personnel (NECC, 2014). They 
provide a wide range of construction support to forward operating forces such as roads, 
bridges, bunkers, airfields, and logistics bases. In addition, they provide responsive 
support to assist disaster recovery operations, perform civic actions, manage construction 
projects to improve relations with other nations, and provide anti-terrorism and force 
protection for personnel. Their motto is “We Build, We Fight” (NECC, 2014; NKO, 
2014). 
c. Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) provides a wide range of services from 
disarming land and underwater explosive hazards to conducting counter improvised 
explosive device (IED) operations. EOD personnel comprise 8.6% (Figure 2) of the total 
NECC manning. EOD is capable of handling chemical, biological and radiological 
threats. EOD’s Mobile Diving and Salvage Units (MDSU) clear harbors of navigation 
hazards, engage in underwater search and recovery operations, and provide limited 
underwater repairs on ships (NECC, 2014; NKO, 2014). 
d. Maritime Expeditionary Security Force 
The Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces (MESF) is the second largest sub-
command in the NECC at 22% (Figure 2) of the manning total. It is comprised of highly 
trained scalable and sustainable security units with the primary mission of defending 
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mission critical assets in near-coast environments. Expeditionary Security units provide 
worldwide maritime and in-shore surveillance, security, anti-terrorism force protection 
(ATFP), ground and afloat asset defense, and airfield/aircraft security. Additionally, 
MESF are capable of providing additional secondary tasks from detention operations to 
law enforcement (NECC, 2014; NKO, 2014). 
e. Expeditionary Intelligence Command 
Expeditionary Intelligence Command (NEIC) is capable of delivering rapid, 
flexible, relevant, and timely intelligence to expeditionary forces. This gives the forces 
freedom of movement within their area of operations. They are also capable of providing 
waterborne lines of communication to the supported forces which allows the forces to 
find, fix, and destroy the enemy and his assets within the area of operation. The NEIC is a 
small unit, i.e., 0.9% of the NECC (NECC, 2014; NKO, 2014). 
f. Combat Camera 
Combat Camera (COMCAM) generates video and still documentation of combat 
operations, contingencies, exercises, and naval events of historical significance. They are 
one of the smallest components of NECC at 0.3% (NKO, 2014). 
g. Expeditionary Logistics 
Expeditionary Logistics (NAVELSG) provide centralized worldwide 
expeditionary logistics support to all NECC expeditionary forces. NAVELSG is the third 
largest component of the NECC at 12.2% of total NECC manning. NAVELSG is 
responsible for conducting port and air cargo handling, customs inspections, contingency 
contracting, fuels procurement and distribution, freight terminal and warehouse 
operations, postal services, and ordnance reporting and handling (NKO, 2014). 
h. Expeditionary Combat Readiness 
Expeditionary Combat Readiness is responsible for coordinating and overseeing 
all administrative processes. This includes equipping, training, deployment, and re-
deployment of sailors assigned as individual augmentees (IA). Additionally, they have 
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provisional units committed to Joint and Maritime Operations. They are the smallest 
component of NECC at 0.2% (NKO, 2014; NECC, 2014). 
i. Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command 
Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCAST) works directly 
with civil authorities and civilian populations within a combatant commander’s maritime 
area of operations. Their main objective is to lessen the impact of military operations on 
the civilian populace. The command also delivers timely, focused, and customizable 
training to host nations. It is versed in drawing training expertise from across the NECC 
force and DOD. They are another smaller component of NECC at 1.1% (NECC, 2014; 
NKO, 2014). 
j. Guard Battalion 
Guard Battalion (NEGB) is part of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-
GTMO) with the complete administrative oversight for NEGB-GTMO. The NEGB is 
2.2% of the NECC. The NEGB is fully educated and trained in the procedures involving 
detainee operations such as cultural and legal issues, self-defense, first aid, use of non-
lethal and lethal weapons, and qualification for external security (NECC, 2014; NKO, 
2014). 
B. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND  
The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW) is the maritime component of U.S. 
Special Operation Command (USSOCOM). NSW is considered a tactical force with 
strategic impact (NKO, 2014). In addition to NSW, USSOCOM is comprised of four 
additional sub-commands: Joint Special Operations Command, Marine Special 
Operations Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, and Army Special 
Operations Command (see Figure 3). NSW forces are capable of operating independently 
or in conjunction with other U.S., allied, and coalition forces (NKO, 2014). 
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Figure 3.  NSW Organization Structure (after NKO, 2014). 
1. Naval Special Warfare Mission Areas 
NSW has seven mission areas and the priorities of these missions are based on the 
risk to our national security. These mission areas are (USSOCOM, 2012): 
1) Combating terrorism is comprised of antiterrorism (defensive actions) and 
counterterrorism (offensive actions). 
2) Counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is 
composed of the actions taken to seize, destroy, capture, or recover WMD. 
3) Direct action which is comprised of short strikes, raids and ambushes, 
standoff attacks, recovery operations, precision destruction, anti-surface 
warfare, and amphibious warfare. 
4) Special reconnaissance is comprised of environmental reconnaissance, 
armed reconnaissance, coastal patrol and interdiction, target and threat 
assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. 
5) Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary 
operations predominantly conducted by indigenous forces such as guerrilla 
warfare, covert or clandestine operations, subversion, sabotage, and 
support of evasion and escapes. 
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6) Physiological/information warfare induces or reinforces foreign civil or 
military attitudes and behaviors favorable to our objectives. 
7) Foreign Internal Defense is the organization, training, advising, and 
assisting of host nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces to maintain 
internal stability. (p. 8) 
 
Figure 4.  NSW Mission Range (from NKO, 2014). 
2. Naval Special Warfare Squadron Structure 
NSW is SEAL Teams and SEAL Team support-centric and deploys as an NSW 
squadron (NSWRON). NSWRON is commanded by a Navy SEAL Commander (O-5), 
and it is comprised of SEAL platoons and attachments from NSW Headquarter, EOD, 
Special Boat Teams, Tactical, Medical, logistical support, and other support units. 
NSWRON size is approximately 250 personnel. 
Platoon size is approximately 14–21 people per platoon. Based on a mission, 
platoons can be structured to operate as 8-man Squads, 4-man Fire Teams, or 2-man 
Sniper/Reconnaissance Teams. It is this organizational structure (see Figure 5) that makes 
the NSW force light, mobile, flexible, and effective (NWP 3.05.41, 2010). 
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Figure 5.  NSW Squadron Structure (from NWP 3.05.41, 2010). 
Based on the theater or mission requirements, NSWRON generally deploys with 
additional resources from outside the Teams: 
 Additional CSS personnel (from LOGSU, IA, and/or Reserves): 15–40 
personnel 
 Communications Troop (sourced from Mobile Comms Team): 20–24 
personnel 
 Military Working Dog (MWD) and Handler (SA-1/SA-2): 2 handlers per 
team 
 UAV Detachment (SA-1/SA-2): varies 
 RIB Detachment (from SBT): 12 personnel for every 2 RIBs 
 EOD (from EODMU): 4–8 EOD techs 
 Intel Support Augments (various sources): 2–5 personnel 
 Mobile Field Surgical Team (MFST) and/or Critical Care Evacuation 
Team (CCET): approximately 12 people 
Not all NSWRON will have all of the above nor would they necessarily be in all 
locations. For example, a platoon deploying to Guam may be accompanied by a RIB 
Detachment, but another platoon from the same team deploying to Afghanistan at the 
same time would obviously not need RIBs. At any given time, each NSWRON is in one 
of the four phases of a two-year cycle and each phase is six months (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6.  NSWRON Deployment Cycle (from NWP 3.05.41, 2010). 
Phase one of the cycle is called the professional development (PRODEV). During 
this phase, NSWRON personnel receive individual training to build their core 
competence. During phase two—the unit level training (ULT)—NSWRON train and 
learn how to work as individual units or as a team. Phase three squadron interoperability 
training (SIT) is probably the most critical phase of the cycle. During this phase, 
individual teams/units are integrated into an NSWRON and learn to work together in a 
squadron as a whole. Finally, in the phase four deployment (DEPLOY), NSWRON 
deploy and they are under control of one of the seven theater special operations 
commands (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7.  Theater Special Operations Commands (from NKO, 2014). 
3. Theater Special Operations Commands 
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) are considered to be geographic 
experts for all special operations in their theater. They report to their geographic 
combatant commander and are responsible for planning, preparation, and command and 
control of Special Operation Forces (SOF) from the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force 
(USSOCOM, 2012). 
a. Special Operations Command Central 
Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) is headquartered at MacDill 
Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. It is a sub-unified command of the U.S. Central 
Command (USCENTCOM). SOCCENT’s primary task is planning special operations 
throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Its other tasks are planning 
and conducting peacetime joint/combined special operations training exercises and 
orchestrating command and control (C2) of peacetime and wartime special operations. 
SOCCENT is heavily dependent upon reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees 
(IMAs) for its daily operations and conduct exercises as directed (Pike, 2013). 
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b. Joint Forces Command 
Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM), located in Norfolk, Virginia, is a sub-
unified command of USJFCOM. SOCJFCOM’s primary task is to train conventional 
joint forces and SOF commanders and staffs (combatant commanders and joint task force 
staffs). Its other tasks include collecting and reporting operational insights and lessons 
learned and providing SOF subject matter experts support to joint integration and 
experimentation efforts (Pike, 2013). 
c. Special Operations Command Pacific 
Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), located at Camp H. M. Smith, 
Oahu, Hawaii, is a sub-unified command and special operations forces component 
command for the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). SOCPAC’s primary task is to plan 
and direct special operations and related activities in the Pacific Theater. It represents the 
largest geographic area of the unified commands (Pike, 2013). 
d. Special Operations Command, South 
Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH), located at Homestead AFB, 
Florida, is a sub-unified command for special operations. SOCSOUTH’s primary task is 
to support the USSOUTHCOM Strategy of Cooperative Regional Peacetime 
Engagement. They provide SOF capabilities to assist shaping theater’s security 
environment and to provide appropriate force posture response when U.S. interests are 
threatened. Their AOR includes the land and surrounding waters of Latin America (south 
of Mexico), the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico (Pike, 2013). 
e. Special Operations Command, Europe 
Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR), located in Stuttgart, Germany, 
is a sub-unified command of U.S. European Command (EUCOM). SOCEUR’s primary 
task is to provide operational direction and control of special operations, civil affairs, and 
psychological operations forces in the EUCOM area. It is responsible for supporting 
U.S./NATO partnership activities and execution of counterterrorism, peacetime, and 
contingency operations (Pike, 2013). 
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f. Special Operations Command, Africa 
Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA), located in Stuttgart, 
Germany, is a sub-unified special operations command for Africa. SOCAFRICA’s 
primary task is to support AFRICOM’s mission with the full spectrum of Special 
Operations Forces capabilities. This includes civil affairs, information operations, theater 
security cooperation, crisis response, and campaign planning (Pike, 2013). 
g. Special Operations Command, Korea 
Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR), located at Camp Kim in 
Yongsan, Korea, is responsible for supporting U.S. Forces Korea/United Nations 
Command/Combined Forces Command for special operations forces on the Korean 
peninsula. SOCKOR’s primary task is war planning. Its other tasks are targeting, training, 
and participating in exercises and contingency operations on the Korean peninsula (Pike, 
2013). 
4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group Capability 
Navy EOD units are very unique in the sense that they are the only military force 
capable of both parachuting in from the air and diving under the sea to disarm weapons. 
There are a total of two EOD organizational groups (EODGRU): EODGRU ONE is 
located in San Diego, California (Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado); EODGRU TWO 
is located in Virginia Beach, Virginia (Joint Expeditionary Base, Little Creek). Each 
group is comprised of five units (Figure 8): Mobile Units (EODMU), Mobile Dive and 
Salvage Units (MDS), Training and Evaluation Units (EODTEU), Operational Support 
Unit, and Expeditionary Support Units (ESU) (NKO, 2014; EOD, 2012). 
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Figure 8.  EDO Group Structure (from EODESU1, 2014). 
a. Mobile Units 
Mobile Units (EODMU) provide deployable command and control (C2) combat 
units for electronic ordnance disposal, counter-IED (Improvised Explosive Device), and 
diving and salvage operations to joint, naval, and combined task force commanders. Each 
mobile unit is capable of deploying independently or as an imbedded force with other 
services or commands (NKO, 2014; EOD, 2012). 
b. Training and Evaluation Units  
Training and Evaluation Units (EODTEU) are specialized training units that 
provide advanced unit level and mobility skill training for deploying forces. They 
specialize in four types of skill sets: Core EOD, Navy Diver Salvage, Core Mobility, and 
Expeditionary Skills (NKO, 2014; EOD, 2012). 
c. Operational Support Unit 
Operational support units are the reservists that perform the same functions as 
mobile units and serve to reduce the operational stress on active duty troops (NKO, 2014; 
EOD, 2012). 
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d. Mobile Dive and Salvage Units 
Mobile Dive and Salvage Units (MDS) are special dive teams capable of 
conducting under water harbor clearance, diving and salvage, and limited battle damage 
repair. They also are equipped with and maintain a variety of underwater equipment such 
as scuba gear, towed sonar devices, and unmanned under-water vehicles that they use to 
perform search operations in different bodies of water (NKO, 2014; EOD, 2012). 
e. Expeditionary Support Units 
Expeditionary Support Units (ESU) support all of the logistical and financial 
management needs associated with all EOD units. ESU’s mission is to provide financial, 
logistic, and material maintenance management for all EODGRU forces (NKO, 2014; 
EOD, 2012). 
5. Naval Special Warfare Group Capabilities 
Navy Special Warfare command is responsible for training, equipping, and 
deploying components of NSW Squadrons throughout the world. NSW is comprised of 
six NSW Groups (NSWG) located between Coronado, California, and Little creek, 
Virginia. The NSW organization is SEAL-centric and each group is designed with SEAL 
team support in mind. Aside from SEAL teams, groups are comprised of Special Boat 
Teams, Logistical Support Units, and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams (see Figure 9 and 
the following descriptions). 
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Figure 9.  NSW Command Structure (from LOGSU1, 2014). 
a. SEAL Teams 
SEAL stands for Sea, Air, and Land. They are NSW’s Special Operations Force 
and they engage in combat operations. NSW has ten navy SEAL teams (see Figure 5). 
The odd-numbered Teams (1, 3, 5, 7, and 17) are located in Coronado, California. The 
even-numbered teams (2, 4, 8, 10, and 18) are located in Little Creek, Virginia (NKO, 
2014; USSOCOM, 2012). 
b. Special Boat Teams 
The primary mission of the Special Boat Teams (SBT) is to support special 
operations missions on the rivers and coasts using specialized high performance, low 
profile combat crafts. They are capable of stealthy insertion and extraction of SEALs, 
covert reconnaissance, and combat gunfire support (NKO, 2014; USSOCOM, 2012). 
c. Logistical Support Unit 
Logistics Support Units (LOGSU) are regionally located on both coasts and are 
capable of providing full logistics support to their respective NSW groups (NSWG). 
They provide logistics support in the following functional areas: supply, contracting, 
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service, combat systems, facilities management, combat service support, medical, 
communications, and transportation (NKO, 2014; USSOCOM, 2012). 
d. SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams 
The primary mission of the SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams (SDVT) is to provide 
long range under water stealthy delivery systems to SEAL teams. They deploy with the 
SEAL teams on specially modified submarines capable of supporting SEAL Delivery 
Vehicles (SDV), Dry Deck Shelters (DDS), and the Advanced SEAL Delivery System 
(ASDS). SVD are small wet submersible vehicles where the swimmers are exposed to 
water. Their sole purpose is to increase the speed and range for the swimmers. DDS are 
the removable modules that attach to the submarine that allow the divers to enter or exit 
submarines while submerged. ASDS are the mini submarines capable of carrying up to 






















III. EXPEDITIONARY LOGISTICS 
A. DEFINITION 
Joint publication 4.0 defines logistics as “planning and executing the movement 
and support of forces” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). Expeditionary logistics, or EXLOG, 
falls on the line between the operational and tactical levels (see Figure. 9) (NKO, 2014). 
There are several definitions for expeditionary logistics available in various military 
instructions and publications. NECC adopted the expeditionary logistics definition as 
stated in Navy Tactical Reference publication 1–02, which defines expeditionary logistics 
as: 
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance 
of an armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign 
county. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military 
operation that deal with design and development, acquisition storage, 
movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of 
materiel; movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; 
acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of 
facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services (DON NTRP 1-02, 
2012, p. 2-32). 
 
 
Figure 10.  Levels of Logistics (from NKO, 2014). 
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The levels of logistics correspond directly to the three levels of war: Strategic, 
Operational, and Tactical (see Figure 10). Strategic logistics focuses on organizing, 
training, and equipping the SOF forces. Whereas, operational logistics provides the link 
between tactical requirements to strategic capability in order to accomplish operational 
goal. They provide theater-wide logistical support, closely monitor in-theater shortfalls, 
communicate shortfalls to strategic sources, and continuously match tactical requirements 
with strategic recourses. Finally, tactical logistics primarily focuses on providing key 
services to support battles and engagements (NKO, 2014; DON NTRP 1-02, 2012). 
Two primary key areas of focus for EXLOG are Sustainment and Combat Service 
Support. Sustainment provides forces the necessary equipment and services to maintain 
and/or prolong operations until successful mission completion. Effective sustainment 
allows combat commanders and expeditionary forces to have depth to seize, retain, 
exploit, and conduct decisive operations. Combat Service Support allows forward 
operating forces to have necessary supplies, equipment, transportation needs, and various 
services to support elements in theater at all levels of war. 
Expeditionary logistics is often challenged with the “tyranny of distance” (NKO, 
2014). They often operate in areas far from Navy supply and distribution chains. 
Expeditionary logisticians often rely on host nations for support. They heavily rely on 
local contracts, vendor support, and commercially available supplies. 
1. Functional Areas 
EXLOG is comprised of six functional areas (NKO, 2014): Supply, Maintenance, 
Transportation, General Engineering, Medical, and Other Service (food, disbursing, 
postal, MWR, etc.). The main three components of logistics are Supply, Maintenance, 
and Transportation. 
a. Supply 
Supply functions as a materiel and financial management support that is similar to 
Supply Department afloat. The functions include ordering, procurement, receipt, stowage, 
and inventory control of repairable and consumables items. 
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b. Maintenance  
Maintenance functions as a team responsible for developing and performing all 
maintenance policies and procedures. In addition, they are also responsible for all 
equipment maintenance that preserves, repairs, and maintains reliability. 
c. Transportation 
Transportation takes care of movement of personnel and materiel from one point 
to another. They are well versed in worldwide ports of embarkation, debarkation, inter- 
theater, and intra-theater locations. 
d. Engineering 
Expeditionary engineering is primarily a function of the Naval Construction 
Force, commonly referred to as “Seabees.” Individual Seabees can be deployed 
independently or can be imbedded into other expeditionary units. Seabees are capable of 
a wide range of construction services such as combat engineering, rapid runway repair, 
facility damage repair, combat engineering, bridge and road construction, and maintain 
facilities ashore. In addition, they also provide responsive support disaster recovery 
operations and perform civic action construction projects to improve relations with other 
nations. 
e. Health Services 
Health services include all medical, dental, and all health-related functions 
(combat and non-combat ) to include; health maintenance, entomology, medical readiness 
of personnel, food service sanitation, treatment of casualties, and medical evacuation. 
f. Other Logistic Services 
They function as a general area that includes services such as food, post, 
disbursing, exchange, billeting, legal, barber, laundry, and other administrative services 
and functions. 
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B. EXPEDITIONARY SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT PROCESS 
NECC and NSW expeditionary forces both have their own logistical support units 
that specialize in understanding and supporting the unique needs of their forces. 
Expeditionary logistics straddles the line between the operational and tactical levels of 
logistics as shown in Figure 9. 
1. Expeditionary Supply Support 
Expeditionary logisticians deploy with the expeditionary forces to forward 
operating areas to establish supply and logistical hubs as close as possible to the areas of 
operations. NECC and NSW supply and logistical support units are capable of providing 
financial and budget management, contracting support, warehouse management, 
hazardous material (HAZMAT) management, transportation, ammunition management, 
and various other support functions. 
NECC and NSW supply and logistical support units manage three categories of 
gear: Individual, Team Specific, and Programmatic. These categories are comprised of 
various combinations of three sub-categories: Personal Gear Issue (PGI), Table of 
Allowance (TOA), and Major Force Program (MFP-11, Special Operations Forces) gear 
and equipment (NSW only) (NKO, 2014). The gear is issued as an individual issue or a 
team issue. Team issue gear is mainly comprised of TOA commodities. Along with some 
of the individual issue gear, all TOA gear must be either returned back to supply support 
upon return from deployment or turned over to the incoming team in theater using 
Remain-In-Place/TOA (RIP/TOA) processes (NKO, 2014; EODESU1, 2014; LOGSU1, 
2014). 
a. PGI 
PGI refers to organizational clothing and equipment issued to an individual while 
checking into expeditionary command. When standard uniform items are deemed 
inadequate, PGI gear is specifically designed to provide personal protection during 
training, combat, and in hostile environments. Examples of gear are: Uniforms, Cold 
weather gear, Wet or Dry suits, etc. (NKO, 2014). 
 29
b. TOA 
TOA is the listing of approved equipment and materiel required by NECC and 
NSW units to perform their missions in contingency, wartime, and disaster recovery 
operations. TOA is supported by three documents: Required Operational Capability 
(ROC), Projected Operational Environment (POE), and Navy Mission Essential Task List 
(NMETL). TOA listing varies based on a unit’s primary capabilities and mission 
statement. TOA is designed to support all unit requirements for 60 days with the 
exception of food and fuel—supported for 15 days. TOA does not support ammunitions. 
Examples of these are: Weapons, Specialty tools and Equipment, Body armor, etc. 
(NKO, 2014).  
c. MFP-11 Gear and Equipment  
USTEDA is an authorization document for MFP-11 gear and equipment. MFP-11 
gear is specifically for NSW forces. It includes mission-specific items not part of PGI or 
TOA. Rather, they are needed by Special Operations Forces (SPEC OPS) to complete its 
mission. Equipment includes: Unmanned Arial Reconnaissance Vehicles, SPEC OPS-
specific weapons, etc. (NKO, 2014). 
2. Funding and Requisition Process 
Even though NCC and NSW are both part of the Navy, their funding comes from 
different sources. NECC relies solely on the funding from Department of Navy (DON) 
and is provided through USFFC; whereas, NSW funding is provided by Joint Special 
Operations Forces Command and through WARCOM. 
The expeditionary requisitions processes are unique when compared to standard 
fleet requisition process. Over 95% of the fleet requisitions are filled through the navy 
supply system using National Stock Number (NSN). Less than 5% are open purchases. 
Whereas in expeditionary logistics, approximately 70% of the requisitions are open 
purchases and only 30% are NSN requisitions (NKO, 2014). The expeditionary 
environment and mission add unique variables such as distinctive operating environment, 
staying current with technology, and greater need for speed. Because of its availability, 
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these situations force expeditionary units to heavily rely upon open purchases for 
commercial off-the-shelf or local procurement products. NECC and NSW use several IT 
systems (EODESU1, 2014; LOGSU1, 2014), including methods of procurement and 
inventory management. They also use other systems and processes such as NTCSS R-
Supply, WASP, Special Warfare Automated Logistics Information System (SWALIS), 
Special Operations Forces Personal Equipment Advanced Requirements System 
(SPEARS), Readiness and Cost Reporting Program (RCRP), Mobility Inventory Control 
Accountability System (MICAS), garrison reach-back, Government Commercial 
Purchase Card (GCPC), Field Ordering Officer and Paying Agent (FOO/PA), and 
Contracting Support (NKO, 2014). 
(1) R-Supply: computer-based system used by both EOD and NSW. It serves as 
their primary system to manage maintenance, supplies, NSN requisitions, budgeting, and 
financial reporting. 
(2) WASP: stand-alone commercial off-the-shelf inventory management software 
that is used as the primary inventory management system (EODESU). The system was 
implemented in 2010 and serves as EODESU’s primary inventory and warehouse 
management system. WASP is not part of the navy program of record, and it is a non-
networked local system that does not allow asset visibility outside the command. It does 
come with capabilities. These include a barcode scanner, barcode labeling software, and 
basic inventory asset tracking that allows EODESU to manage its inventory much more 
efficiently.  Prior to WASP, the primary method used to manage inventory was MS Excel 
spreadsheets (EODESU1, 2014). 
(3) SWALIS: developed and fielded for U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) to provide Total Asset Visibility (TAV) across the NSW enterprise. 
LOGSU uses this system to primarily manage PGI and TOA gear for NSW forces. 
SWALIS is DODAF-compliant and WLAN-capable. It allows NSW forces to have real-
time visibility on load-out status and locations of all mission-critical equipment 
(LOGSU1, 2014). 
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(4) SPEAR: system used by NSW LOGSUs to manage body armor systems, 
protective eyewear, and Protective Combat Uniform (PCU) (LOGSU1, 2014).  
(5) MICAS: automated system used by LOGSU to track shelf-life and inventory 
of Chemical Biological and Radiological (CBR) individual protective Equipment for 
NSW forces. It provides centralized management of CBR assets. This also means 
centralized reporting capability, increased data accuracies, and improved efficiencies in 
asset visibility and shelf-life management (LOGSU1, 2014). 
(6) Garrison reach-back: when deployed units are unable to obtain materiel or 
equipment locally, they then communicate their needs to the stateside support unit (NKO, 
2014). 
(7) GCPC: based on established spending limits, this allows authorized personnel 
to make micro-purchases to support one’s expeditionary units (NKO, 2014). 
(8) FOO/PA: FOO is an individual authorized in writing by the contracting 
officer to execute purchases using Standard Form (SF) 44. PA is an individual appointed 
in writing to pay for FOO authorized purchases with cash and other negotiable 
instruments (NKO, 2014). 
C. NSW AND EOD LOGISTICAL SUPPORT UNITS 
Logistical Support Units serve as centralized supply, logistics, and support 
functions for their command. They are capable of providing a wide range of services 
essential for successful accomplishment of the mission. EOD is supported through 
Expeditionary Support Units (ESU), whereas, NSW is supported through Logistical 
Support Units (LOGSU). 
1. EOD Logistical Support Unit 
EOD Logistical Support Unit (EODESU) command structure is broken down into 
seven departments with specific function—also referred to as command commodities. 
The command commodities include: administrative, operations, civil engineering support 
equipment (CESE), supply, craft, material, and medical. This study’s focus will primarily 
 32
look into the Supply and Material Department functions such as managing inventory 
processing requirements and managing budgets for all units supported by the ESU. 
 
Figure 11.  EODESU Command Structure (from EODESU 1, 2014). 
The majority of the inventory materiels are managed between the Supply and 
Material commodities (Figure 11). Each department maintains separate warehouses. 
Supply manages PGI gear, whereas the materiel department manages the TOA gear. Both 
use WASP as their primary inventory management system (EODESU1, 2014). 
a. EOD Supply 
Supply functions are similar to the Stock Control (S-1) division ships. Supply is 
responsible for budgeting, inventories requisitioning, and financial reporting. Supply uses 
R-Supply to manage its financial and requisition data; it uses WASP to manage 
warehouse and inventories. They use various procurement methods such as NSN 
requisitions through the navy supply system and open purchases using the government 
credit card (GPCP). GPCPs have a single purchase threshold set at $3k. Any purchases 
over that limit require contracting support from Fleet Logistical Centers (FLC) 
contracting department. Once the material is received at ESU, it is manually inputted and 
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recorded in the WASP. Once material is entered, all tracking, issuing, and inventorying 
are maintained through WASP. 
Supply is also responsible for ensuring all the EOD techs are equipped with PGI 
gear; Material folks are equipped with TOA gear to track and replace missing and lost 
gear (PGI/TOA). EOD’s primary source for acquiring all PGI gear is the NECC’s Central 
Issuing Facility (CIF). The CIF provides central management by using a web-based 
automated system that keeps track of gear requisitions. There are two CIF locations: one 
is located in Port Hueneme, California, and the other is located in Virginia Beach, 
Virginia (EODESU1, 2014). 
b. EOD Materiels 
The Materiels warehouse is used primarily for TOA gear and controlled by non-
supply rated EOD techs. EOD techs receive on-the-job inventory management training. 
The Material department receives the authorized TOA listing from Readiness and Cost 
Reporting Program (RCRP) and through end user feedback and is required to maintain an 
adequate inventory to maintain readiness.  
RCRP provides capabilities to satisfy the readiness and logistics needs of Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) operating forces. RCRP is a readiness 
reporting system, which provides NECC forces with a standardized, enterprise-wide 
capacity to measure, display, and report the readiness status of Personnel, Equipment, 
Supply, Training and Ordnance. 
Materiels personnel are responsible for issuing from and returning of the TOA 
gear after use back to their warehouse. They also responsible for logistical overhaul of 
the TOA gear. This basically means they are capable of repairing, reconditioning, and 
replacing any and all TOA gear once it is return back to them (EODESU1, 2014). 
2. NSW Logistical Support Units 
There are a total of three Logistics Support Units: LOGSU ONE and THREE, 
both located at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California; and LOGSU TWO located 
at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Virginia. LOGSU is structured as an Echelon IV 
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command and is commanded by an O-5 Supply Corps Officer. They are further 
subdivided into six departments and are responsible for providing Combat Service 
Support Troops (CSST) to deploying NSWRON. 
 
Figure 12.  LOGSU Command Structure (from LOGSU1, 2014). 
CSST provides coordination between appropriate component commands and 
offices to provide support to forward-deployed NSW forces. This allows NSW forces to 
have contingency contracting capability and expertise in making small purchases in 
theater. 
a. NSW Supply 
Similar to EOD supply, NSW supply functions are similar. NSW’s primary 
functions are budgeting, inventory requisitioning, and financial reporting. They use R-
Supply to manage its financial and requisition data. They also manage warehouse and 
inventory with several IT systems: SWALIS for PGI and TOA; SPEARS for body armor; 
and MICAS for CBR gear. These systems are not compatible with each other and require 
manual entries once the material is received at the supply warehouse. Their procurement 
methods are similar to EOD, but NSW does have its own dedicated contracting 
department for non-NSN purchases above $3k (LOGSU1, 2014). 
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IV. CASE STUDY 
Background 
As America concludes the war in Iraq and continues its efforts to withdraw from 
Afghanistan, our National Defense Strategy has been necessarily tempered by the 
recognition of the enormous expenses incurred in these wars. While our efforts in these 
conflicts demonstrated the potency of America’s military capability, the expenses they 
incurred, and the debt burden they placed on the nation’s budget highlighted the 
increasing vulnerability of our finances. The nation will face threats from both traditional 
state actors and nontraditional actors such as terrorist organizations and it must be 
prepared to meet them. In all cases, however, the nation’s plans must consider the 
prudent use of financial resources and prioritize them more effectively than at almost any 
time in recent history. This change in perspective is reflected in the recent 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review that includes a lengthy discussion of the impact of the 
Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 as well as the possible effects that sequester-level 
cuts could have on the Navy. It is clear from this discussion that the financial pressure on 
the Navy is growing and the need to find and implement cost saving measures is critical 
to our service’s continued success. 
U.S. Navy Expeditionary Forces are comprised of two separate commands: Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) and Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW). 
Through the Authorization Act of 1987, NSW was commissioned as the maritime 
component of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Then in 2006, 
NECC was established under U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC). The key reason for 
this separation lies in the nature of the missions with which each command is assigned. 
The primary mission of NECC is to provide combat ready units for expeditionary 
missions to the Joint Coalition Force Maritime Component Commands (JFMCC) and 
Navy Unified Combatant Commands (COCOM). This is in contrast to NSW, which is a 
tactical force that conducts missions with strategic impact to alleviate the risks to our 
national security. 
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Expeditionary combat forces perform a mission that is unlike that of the 
traditional Navy. Further, the logistics that support them is different as well and requires 
particular study to understand and appreciate the challenges inherent to the mission. The 
following are two case studies. Each examines the typical logistics operations required to 
support NSW squadron and EOD mobile units as they each progress through their 
respective fleet readiness training program (FRTP) cycles from the BEGINNING PHASE 
to their return from deployment. It should be made clear at the outset that although the 
case studies are hypothetical, they are highly realistic. The case study methodology will 
clearly illustrate the business practices currently in place. It will also provide opportunity 
for conducting a critical analysis of these procedures and generating recommendations 
for improvement and further inquiry. The goal of these case studies is to contribute to the 
improvement of the financial performance of these organizations to enhance their combat 
effectiveness. 
A. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE LOGISTICS STUDY 
We visited Logistical Support Unit ONE (LOGSU 1) in Coronado, California, to 
better understand their logistical process as part of this study’s research. While visiting, it 
was discovered that they were facing approximately 70% loss in accountability (Exhibit 
1) in their issued gear as the NSW squadrons returned from deployment. In light of 
current fiscal constraints and budget cuts, it is imperative that NSW forces maintain 
readiness. If these losses continue, they will have significant impact on readiness. The 
goal in this case study is to describe the current NSW processes for both gear 




Naval Special Warfare Squadron X (NSWRON X) based out of Naval 
Amphibious Base, Coronado, California, has returned from their six-month deployment. 
During this deployment, they were under the control of Theater Special Operations 
Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA) (Exhibit 2). In addition to the equipment already pre-
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staged in theater, they had deployed with a significant amount of gear and equipment—
approximately 30-40 Individual Storage Units (ISU). The equipment already in theater is 
considered Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) gear that goes through a 
custody turnover between the outgoing and incoming squadrons. Examples of typical 
RIP/TOA gear would be vehicles, boats, UAV’s and their systems, generators, and 
similar items. Upon return from deployment, the gear that NSWRON took with them is 
required to be returned to Logistical Support Unit One (LOGSU ONE) for 
reconditioning, repairs, replacement, and reissue. 
NSW organization is SEAL-centric; thus, each group is designed with SEAL team 
support in mind. NSW is comprised of six NSW Groups (NSWG) located between 
Coronado, California, and Little Creek, Virginia. Aside from the SEAL teams, groups  
are comprised of five sub-commands: Advanced SEAL Delivery System Team, Special 
Boat Teams, Logistical Support Units, SEAL Delivery Teams, and Intelligence/ 
Reconnaissance Teams (Exhibit 3). NSW forces are capable of operating independently 
or in conjunction with other U.S. allied and coalition forces. 
NSW has seven mission areas which are prioritized based upon the risk to the 
nation’s national security. These mission areas are: combating terrorism, counter-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), direct action, special 
reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, physiological/information warfare, and foreign 
internal defense (Exhibit 4). 
NSW forces deploy as a squadron (NSWRON). NSWRON is commanded by a 
Navy SEAL Commander (O-5) and it is comprised of SEAL platoons and attachments 
from NSW Headquarters, EOD, Special Boat Teams, Tactical, Medical, logistical 
support, and other support units. NSWRON size is approximately 250 personnel (Exhibit 
7). At any given time, each NSWRON is in one of the four phases of a two-year 
training/deployment cycle determined by USSOCOM. Each of the following phases is 
six-months long (Exhibit 5): 
 Phase one: Professional Development (PRODEV). During this phase, 
NSWRON personnel receive individual training to build and refine their 
core competencies. 
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 Phase two: Unit Level Training (ULT). During this phase, individuals 
learn how to work as a unit or a team. 
 Phase three: Squadron Interoperability Training (SIT). This is probably the 
most critical phase of the cycle. During this phase, individual teams/units 
are integrated into a NSWRON and they learn to work together in a 
squadron as a whole. 
 Phase four: Deployment (DEPLOY). During this phase, NSWRON 
deploys and is under the control of one of the seven theaters’ special 
operations commands. 
Once NSWRON enters into the first phase of their training cycle, the Logistical 
Support Unit (LOGSU) initiates the gear issue process. It is imperative that NSWRON 
train with the same gear that is going to be used during its deployment. This allows gear 
proficiency and the ability to identify any unforeseen gear issues prior to deployment. 
 
Logistical Support Units 
LOGSU is comprised of six departments: supply, medical, transportation, 
operations, weapons, and administration (Exhibit 10). Each department is responsible for 
maintaining and equipping NSW forces with the specific items needed for deployment. 
LOGSU’s manage three categories of gear issued to NSW forces: Individual, Team 
Specific, and Programmatic. These three categories are comprised of combinations of 
three sub-categories: Personal Gear Issue (PGI), Table of Allowance (TOA), and Major 
Force Program 11 (MFP-11) gear and equipment (Exhibit 8). Additionally, LOGSU is 
responsible for providing Combat Service Support Troops (CSST) personnel to deploying 
squadrons. 
 
Gear Issue Process 
LOGSU uses several IT systems to manage its gear. R-Supply is the primary 
system for financials, budgeting, and NSN item procurement and management. SWALIS 
is the primary warehouse inventory management system. In addition to SWALIS, 
SPEARS is used for body armor management, and MICAS is used for Chemical 
Biological Radiological (CBR) gear management. 
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Starting at phase one of the deployment cycle, NSWRON personnel and teams are 
responsible for identifying, requesting, and picking up the needed gear at LOGSU. For 
example, they go to supply for PGI and some TOA items; Weapons department for 
weapons; operations for parachutes or dive gear; and on (Exhibit 10). These departments 
are not centrally located, and they maintain their own warehouses. They issue the items 
using SWALIS and manually generate DD Form 1149 (Requisition and Invoice/Shipping 
form). There is a full listing in R-Supply for custody turnover. This process requires 
double entries because the R-Supply and SWALIS databases are not compatible with 
each other. LOGSU ONE coined this process as “Swivel Chair” inventory management. 
This is because it literally requires chair swiveling between the two systems while 
issuing, receiving, or returning gear. Once the gear is issued, the DD Form 1149 becomes 
the primary source of gear inventory management for the NSW teams. If there are any 
items needed that are not in the warehouse inventory, the appropriate departments submit 
purchase requests to Supply for procurement. 
 
Procurement Process 
The Supply department serves as a centralized location for all procurements for 
the NSW group. Supply primarily uses two methods for procurement. It receives the 
procurement requests submitted by other departments. Then based on the cost or type of 
items, the appropriate procurement process is initiated. Supply uses standard NSN 
requisitions through the Navy supply system and open-purchases through commercial 
sources. A government credit card (GCPC) is used for single purchases under $3k, and 
any purchases over $3k are completed using already in place IDIQ contracts, GSA 
sources, or NSW contracting support for any new contracts. 
The expeditionary requisitions processes are unique when compared to standard 
fleet requisition process. Over 95% of fleet requisitions are filled through the Navy 
supply system using National Stock Number (NSN). Less than 5% are open-purchases. In 
comparison, approximately 70% of the requisitions in expeditionary logistics are open-
purchases, and only 30% are NSN requisitions (NKO, 2014). 
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The NSN requisition process is quite simple. Logistical specialists (LS) use R-
supply to generate a requisition, and then they electronically release it to the Navy supply 
system for fulfillment. Obligated funds are then automatically subtracted from the 
command’s total budget. Once the requisitions are received at their warehouse, R-supply 
automatically assigns a location either for stocking in the warehouse or issuing to the 
respective department. If the item requested is a non-NSN item, the open-purchase 
through commercial sources procurement method is used. 
To initiate open-purchase, LSs obligate funds in R-Supply to the GCPC line of 
accounting or the contract line of accounting. Then the commercial source is paid using a 
GCPC. Without first obligating money in R-supply, there is no authorization to pay the 
source. Once the product is received from the vendor, the transaction total is confirmed in 
R-supply. Then LSs manually record each item in SWALIS to either stock the item(s) in 
the warehouse or get each ready for issuing. 
 
During the Training Cycle  
As NSWRON goes through the training cycle, they use the same gear they will 
bring on deployment or on assignment to via the RIP/TOA process. During the training 
cycle, if gear gets damaged, lost, or consumed, a designated team member goes to 
LOGSU for a replacement item. Consumable gear/items are replenished, and 
damaged/lost items are replaced through either the one-for one turn-in process or survey 
process using DD form 200. 
 One-for-one turn-in process: Broken or damaged gear is brought back to 
the appropriate department at LOGSU for replacement from stock. After 
the replacement, the appropriate department either repairs or requests 
replacement of the broken item to ready it for reissue. 
 Survey process: If the item has been lost, the responsible team fills out a 
DD form 200 explaining the situation, and then obtains approval through 
the team’s chain of command. Based on the cost or classification of the 
item (unclassified or classified), an investigation might be required prior 
to replacement. All items above $2k in value, weapons, or classified 




NSW Deployment  
Once the NSWRON is ready for deployment, the gear is inventoried and stored in 
ISUs for transportation to the theater. An ISU is approximately one-third the size of a 
CONEX box. LOGSU’s transportation department coordinates with the U.S. 
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to transport NSWRON personnel and their 
gear with the exception of RIP/TOA gear to the theater. 
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM) mission 
is to provide strategic common-user air, land and sea transportation to 
deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy military forces to meet national 
security objective across the range of military operations. It is comprised 
of the Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), 
and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC). 
USTRANSCOM normally functions as the supporting command to the 
geographic commander and serves as the single manager for common-user 
ports. Each Service specific theater distribution network will use organic 
transportation resources that are under the operational control of the 
theater Service component. Combatant commanders may request 
USTRANSCOM to operate dedicated express transportation to in-theater 
destinations different from usual aerial and surface points of debarkation. 
(Perez, Nilsen, Tessier, & Lugo, 2004, p. 6) 
 
In-theater Requisition Process  
Due to incompatibility in infrastructure, when NSWRON is assigned to a non-
Navy command, the support personnel are required to use the host command’s logistics 
IT systems. They have, however, the capability to access SWALIS remotely. This access 
allows them visibility to stateside assets and gives the ability to add or remove items as 
needed in theater. For this particular example, NSWRON X was under the control of 
Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA) (an Army command). NSW 
Logistics Combat Service Support (CSS) personnel deployed with NSWRON must use 
the Army’s requisition system Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARRS) to track its 
requisitions or use DD form 448 (Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR)). 
DD form 448 is used to procure supplies or services. It is also used to transfer funds from 
other services. In addition to this, they also rely heavily on GCPC, Field Ordering and 
Paying Agent (FOO/PA), garrison reach-back, and in-theater contracts (husbanding 
agents) (Exhibit 9). 
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NSWRON teams and units are responsible for maintaining their gear inventory by 
using DD form 1149 as their primary inventory document. As the items get consumed, 
damaged, or lost, they are responsible for notifying Logistics CSS for replenishment or 
replacement. The in-theater CSS procurement process is slightly different from that on 
stateside. Team or individual gear replacement happens through CSS versus LOGSU. 
Due to time and geographic constraints, local resources are evaluated first, and if 
comparable items are available locally they are purchased using GPCP or FOO/PA. To 
minimize disruption to the mission, the goal is to have the gear fixed or replaced through 
the fastest means possible. A GCPC single purchase limit can be increased up to $25k 
with proper TYCOM approvals. They still have to follow the same One-for-one exchange 
or Survey process for replacements. If the item cannot be procured locally, CSS reaches 
back to stateside LOGSU for procurement. This process is known as garrison reach-back. 
Once the item is procured, LOGSU ships the item to the deployed unit using DHL 
delivery service. 
 
Return to Homeport 
Prior to returning from deployment, NSWRON first goes through the RIP/TOA 
process for custody turnover of all equipment and gear that is to remain in-place in the 
theater of operations for the incoming squadron. Meanwhile, LOGSU’s transportation 
department coordinates with USTRANSCOM to transport NSWRON personnel and their 
gear back to homeport. Upon return to homeport, NSWRON teams and personnel return 
all TOA-issued gear back to LOGSU. This process is the reconciliation process, and a 
joint inventory of all of the issued items is conducted by both the appropriate departments 
in LOGSU and the teams. All DD form 1149s are then verified against SWALIS’s 
electronic database. The returned equipment and gear goes through the Expeditionary 
Logistics Overhaul (ELO) process. During this process, LOGSU departments identify the 
gear that needs repair or reconditioning, is missing, or needs replacement. Each 
department has qualified technicians capable of repairing and reconditioning TOA gear. 
Items missing or beyond repair are immediately processed for replacement using the 
survey process (DD form 200) and are submitted to Supply for procurement. The ELO 
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process is a cost savings process. The process allows LOGSU to efficiently and cost-
effectively have the gear ready for the next deployable NSWRON. 
 
Exhibit 1 LOGSU Materiel Losses (from LOGSU1, 2014) 
 
 




Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) are considered geographic 
experts for all special operations in their theater. They report to their geographic 
combatant commander and are responsible for planning, preparation, and command and 
control of Special Operation Forces (SOF) from the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force 
(USSOCOM, 2012). 
Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA) is located in Stuttgart, 
Germany and is a sub-unified special operations command for Africa. SOCAFRICA’s 
primary task is to support AFRICOM’s mission with the full spectrum of Special 
Operations Forces capabilities. These include civil affairs, information operations, theater 
security cooperation, crisis response, and campaign planning (Pike, 2013). 
Mission 
United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international 
partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats 
transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and to promote regional 
security, stability, and prosperity. 
Exhibit 3 NSW Organization Structure (after NKO, 2014) 
 
NSW Organization Structure (after NKO, 2014). 
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Exhibit 4 Naval Special Warfare Capabilities 
 
SEAL Teams: SEAL stands for Sea, Air, and Land. They are considered the 
NSW’s Special Operations Force who engages in combat operations. NSW has ten navy 
SEAL teams (Figure 5): the odd-numbered Teams (1, 3, 5, 7, and 17) are located in 
Coronado, California, and the even-numbered teams (2, 4, 8, 10, and 18) are located in 
Little Creek, Virginia. 
Special Boat Teams (SBT): Their primary mission is to support special 
operations missions on the rivers and coasts using specialized high performance, low-
profile combat crafts. They are capable of stealthy insertion and extraction of SEALs, 
covert reconnaissance, and combat gunfire support. 
Logistics Support Units (LOGSU): They are regionally located on both coasts 
and are capable of providing full logistics support to their respective NSW groups 
(NSWG). They provide logistics support in the following functional areas: supply, 
contracting, service, combat systems, facilities management, combat service support, 
medical, communications, and transportation. 
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams (SDVT): Their primary mission is to provide a 
long range under water stealthy delivery system to SEAL teams. They deploy with the 
SEAL teams on specially modified submarines. The submarines are capable of 
supporting SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDV), Dry Deck Shelters (DDS), and the Advanced 
SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). SVDs are small wet submersible vehicles, where the 
swimmers are exposed to water. Their sole purpose is to increase the speed and range for 
the swimmers. DDSs are the removable modules that attach to the submarine, allowing 
the divers to enter or exit submarines while submerged. ASDSs are mini submarines 
















1) Combating terrorism is comprised of antiterrorism (defensive actions) and 
counterterrorism (offensive actions). 
2) Counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is comprised 
of the actions taken to seize, destroy, capture, or recover WMD. 
3) Direct action is comprised of short strikes, raids and ambushes, standoff 
attacks, recovery operations, precision destruction, anti-surface warfare, and 
amphibious warfare. 
4) Special reconnaissance is comprised of environmental reconnaissance, armed 
reconnaissance, coastal patrol and interdiction, target and threat assessment, 
and post-strike reconnaissance. 
5) Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary 
operations predominantly conducted by indigenous forces. These include 
guerrilla warfare, covert or clandestine operations, subversion, sabotage, and 
support of evasion and escapes. 
6) Physiological/information warfare induces or reinforces foreign civil or 
military attitudes and behaviors favorable to our objectives. 
7) Foreign Internal Defense is the organization, training, advising, and assisting 
the host nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces to maintain internal 
stability. 
 





NSWRON is comprised of eight SEAL platoons. Platoon size is approximately 
14-21 people. Based on a mission, platoons can be structured to operate as 8-man Squads, 
4-man Fire Teams, or 2-man Sniper/Reconnaissance Teams (NWP 3.05.41, 2010). 
 
Based on the theater or mission requirements, NSWRON generally deploys with 
additional resources from outside the Teams: 
 Additional CSS personnel (from LOGSU, IA, and/or Reserves): 15–40 
personnel 
 Communications Troop (sourced from Mobile Comms Team): 20–24 
personnel 
 Military Working Dog (MWD) and Handler (SA-1/SA-2): 2 handlers per 
team 
 UAV Detachment (SA-1/SA-2): varies 
 RIB Detachment (from SBT): 12 personnel for every 2 RIBs 
 EOD (from EODMU): 4–8 EOD techs 
 Intel Support Augments (various sources): 2–5 personnel 
 Mobile Field Surgical Team (MFST) and/or Critical Care Evacuation 




EXHIBIT 8 Types of Gear 
 
1) PGI: This refers to organizational clothing and equipment issued to an individual 
while checking into expeditionary command. When standard uniform items are 
deemed inadequate, PGI gear is specifically designed to provide personal 
protection during training, combat, and in hostile environments. Examples of gear 
are: Uniforms, Cold weather gear, Wet or Dry suits, etc. 
 
2) TOA: This is the listing of approved equipment and materiel required by NECC 
and NSW units to perform their missions in contingency, wartime, and disaster 
recovery operations. TOA developed is supported by three documents: Required 
Operational Capability (ROC), Projected Operational Environment (POE), and 
Navy Mission Essential Task List (NMETL). TOA listing varies based on the 
unit’s primary capabilities and mission statement. TOA is designed to support all 
unit requirements for 60 days with the exception of food and fuel—supported for 
15 days. TOA does not support ammunitions. Examples of these are: Weapons, 
Specialty tools and Equipment, Body armor, etc. 
 
3) MFP-11 gear and equipment: USTEDA is an authorization document for MFP-
11 gear and equipment. MFP-11 gear is specifically for NSW forces. It includes 
mission-specific items not part of PGI or TOA. Rather, they are needed by 
Special Operations Forces (SPEC OPS) to complete its mission. Equipment 

















EXHIBIT 9 Types IT Systems and Procurement Processes 
 
1) R-Supply: computer based system used by both EOD and NSW. It serves as their 
primary system to manage maintenance, supplies, NSN requisitions, budgeting, 
and financial reporting. 
2) WASP: stand-alone commercial off-the-shelf inventory management software 
that is used as the primary inventory management system (EODESU). The system 
was implemented in 2010 and serves as EODESU’s primary inventory and 
warehouse management system. WASP is not part of the navy program of record, 
and it is a non-networked local system that does not allow asset visibility outside 
the command. It does come with capabilities: barcode scanner, barcode labeling 
software, and basic inventory / asset tracking that allows EODESU to manage its 
inventory much more efficiently. Prior to WASP, the primary method used to 
manage inventory was MS Excel spreadsheets. 
3) SWALIS: developed and fielded for U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) to provide Total Asset Visibility (TAV) across the NSW enterprise. 
LOGSU uses this system to primarily manage PGI and TOA gear for NSW 
forces. SWALIS is DODAF-compliant and WLAN-capable. It allows NSW 
forces to have real-time visibility on load-out status and locations of all mission 
critical equipment. 
4) SPEAR: system used by NSW LOGSUs to manage body armor systems, 
protective eyewear, and Protective Combat Uniform (PCU). 
5) MICAS: automated system used by LOGSU to track shelf-life and inventory of 
Chemical Biological and Radiological (CBR) individual protective Equipment for 
NSW forces. It provides centralized management of CBR assets. This also means 
centralized reporting capability, increased data accuracies, and improved 
efficiencies in asset visibility and shelf-life management. 
6) Garrison reach-back: when deployed units are unable to obtain material or 
equipment locally, they communicate their needs to the stateside Logistics 
Support Unit (LSU). LSU is capable of shipping the material worldwide using 
DHL carrier. 
7) GCPC: based on established spending limits, this allows authorized personnel to 
make micro-purchases to support one’s expeditionary units. 
8) FOO/PA: FOO is an individual authorized by the contracting officer in writing to 
execute purchases using Standard Form (SF) 44. PA is an individual appointed in 
writing to pay for FOO authorized purchases with cash and other negotiable 
instruments. 
9) OPCON/TACON system/process: this process is determined by the specific 
military service serving as a theater operation command. For example, army uses 
Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARRS) for all of its requisition processes; 
whereas, marines use Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS). 
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Exhibit 10 LOGSU Command Structure (from LOGSU1, 2014) 
 
 
B. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL LOGISTICS STUDY 
A request for EOD forces has been generated for the CENTCOM AOR (Exhibit 
1). A Force Tracking Number (FTN) has been identified by the Navy and assigned to 
EODGRU ONE. The FTN describes the details of when, what, where, and how many 
people are needed to accomplish the current mission. The primary mission in this case is 
to counter IED and mine sweeping operations. 
EODGRU ONE has accepted the task order and has assigned it to EOD Mobile Unit Y. 
There are 8-10 platoons within an each mobile unit, and each platoon is composed of 6-8 
EOD techs. EOD Mobile Unit Y is responsible to assign a platoon with the right 
capabilities for the task. All platoons routinely undergo a repetitive training cycle to 
ensure readiness and familiarity with equipment before they are they are ready to deploy.  
Expeditionary Support Unit  
EODESU ONE plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and provides total 
logistics support (TLS) for the EODGRU and the subordinate units that are preparing for 
or in a deployed status. The Expeditionary Support Unit command structure is broken 
down into seven departments with specific functions: administrative, operations, civil 
engineering support equipment (CESE), supply, craft, material, and medical (Exhibit 2). 
Each department provides a unique support capability to EODGRU forces but our 
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primary focus for this case study is supply and materiel’s department. The majority of the 
inventory materials are managed between the Supply and Materiel departments. The 
Supply department is the principal financial, procurement, inventory, and customer 
service managers within the command. Both Supply and Materiel departments maintain 
separate warehouses; Supply manages PGI gear (Exhibits 3, 5) and Materiel manages 
TOA gear (Exhibit 4, 5). 
Supply Department 
The Logistics specialists (LS) use R-Supply to manage financial and requisition 
data. They use WASP—a commercial off-the-shelf system—to manage the warehouse 
inventory. Prior to WASP they used Microsoft Excel as their primary inventory 
management system.  To improve efficiency and inventory accuracy, WASP was adopted 
by the command as the primary inventory management system.  WASP is not part of the 
navy program of record and is a non-networked local system that does communicate nor 
allow asset visibility outside the command.  
Supply’s primary source for acquiring all PGI gear is the NECC’s Central Issuing 
Facility (CIF). The CIF provides central management by using a web-based automated 
system that keeps track of gear requisitions. The CIF operates on a walk-in first-come 
first-serve basis and the average time to fulfill a requisition requirement is typically 
between 2–4 weeks. The process initiated when Supply personnel prepared a requirement 
request document and then transported the document to the closest Central Issuing 
Facility. To date, there are two CIF locations: one is in Port Hueneme, California—
roughly 450 miles away from EODESU ONE in Coronado, California—and the other is 
located in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Due to 450 mile distance from CIF, EODESU ONE 
has to maintain large quantity of PGI gear onsite to improve customer wait time and 
ensure readiness.      
Materiels Department  
The materiel department is controlled mostly by non-supply rated EOD technicians and 
they use WASP as their primary inventory management system. This process is initiated 
after the material department receives an authorized TOA listing both from Readiness 
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and Cost Reporting Program (RCRP) and from end user feedback. To maintain readiness, 
NECC requires the command to maintain an adequate inventory through RCRP at all 
times. RCRP provides capabilities to satisfy the readiness and logistics needs of Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) operating forces. RCRP is a readiness 
reporting system, which provides NECC forces with a standardized, enterprise-wide 
capacity to measure, display, and report the readiness status of Personnel, Equipment, 
Supply, Training and Ordnance. 
 
ESU Gear Issue Process 
PGI and TOA gear is assigned a year out from deployment. This gives the 
assigned platoon an opportunity to train with their assigned equipment. Mobile units tell 
the ESU what they need for deployment. They go to either the supply or material 
department to submit requirement request using a manually generated DD Form 1149 
(Requisition and Invoice/Shipping form). Each department would then check its system 
(WASP) for the items they may have in stock. 
If a special requirement arises for a non-carried piece of equipment, the ESU can 
appropriate the material to fulfill the requirement using various procurement methods. 
These include NSN requisitions through the navy supply system and open purchases 
using government credit card (GPCP). 
The NSN requisition process is quite simple. When a logistical specialist (LS) 
using R-supply generates a requisition and electronically releases it to navy supply 
system for fulfillment; the obligated funds are automatically subtracted from the 
commands’ total budget. Once the requisitions are received at navy’s warehouse, R-
supply automatically assigns them a location either for stocking in the warehouse or for 
issuing to the respective department. 
Contracting support is provided by NAVSUP Feet Logistical Center San Diego / 
Norfolk. A Contracting Review Board (CRB) is held at NECC N41 to validate the 
requirement. Any single purchase over $3K, or for a period of performance greater than 
90 days, will require a contract to go through the contracting department. To initiate an 
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open purchase, LS obligates funds in R-Supply to the GCPC line of accounting or the 
contract line of accounting. Then the commercial source is paid using a GCPC. It does 
not authorize to pay the source without obligating money in R-supply first. Once the 
product is received from the vendor, it is confirmed in R-supply and is manually entered 
into the WASP inventory management system. From that point onwards, all tracking, 
issuing, and inventorying is maintained until ready for issue. 
When compared to standard fleet requisition processes, the expeditionary 
requisitions processes are unique: over 95% of the fleet requisitions are filled through 
navy supply system using National Stock Number (NSN), and less than 5% are open 
purchases. Whereas, in expeditionary logistics approximately, 70% of the requisitions are 
open purchases and only 30% are NSN requisitions (NKO, 2014). 
 
Training Cycle 
During the training cycle, if the gear gets damaged, lost, or consumed, the 
designated team member or an individual goes back to the ESU for replacement gear. 
Replenished, damaged, or lost items will be replaced through a one-for-one turn-
in process or survey process using a DD form 200 (Financial Liability Investigation of 
Property Loss). 
One-for-one turn-in process: The broken or damaged gear is brought back to the 
appropriate department at ESU for replacement from stock. After the replacement, the 
appropriate department either repairs or requests replacement of the item to get it ready 
for reissue. 
Survey process: If the item is lost, the appropriate team fills out a DD form 200. 
In the form, the team explains the situation and obtains approval through its chain of 
command. Based on the cost or classification of the item (unclassified or classified), an 
investigation might be required prior to replacement. All items above $2K, weapons, or 
classified equipment require an investigation prior to replacement. 
Final Evaluation Phase (FEP): A phase in the Mobile unit training cycle where the 
platoon must effectively execute a variety of scenarios they will likely come across in a 
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deployed environment to the satisfaction of NECC Expeditionary Training Group. This 
must be accomplished before receiving certification for deployment. 
One of the most critical areas within this cyclical process is the ability to sustain 
during the present mission. 
 
Deployment 
Mobile Units are responsible for maintaining their gear / inventory using DD form 
1149 as their primary inventory document. As items deteriorate through normal wear and 
tear, get damaged, or lost, they are responsible for notifying the Expeditionary Support 
Element (ESE) officer in charge—led by a Supply Corps Officer. The ESE serves as a 
small scale element of an ESU that is integrated with Mobile Unit Y and provides 
forward support. In theater, the ESE procurement process is slightly different from 
stateside. The goal is always to provide a wide range of support weather organic or 
outsourced through the fastest means possible. GCPC single purchase limit can be 
increased with proper TYCOM approvals. 
The same One-for-one exchange or Survey process for replacement items still 
applies. If compatible, local resources are gauged first and are purchased using the GPCP. 
If the local environment does not have a compatible replacement, the ESE will reach 
back to stateside ESU for procurement. This process is known as garrison reach-back. 
Once the item is procured, the EODESU ship the item to the deployed unit using DHL 
delivery service. 
 
The Return Home 
EOD Mobile Unit Y has returned from their six-month deployment. They 
deployed with a significant amount (8-10 ISU containers) of equipment which is required 
to be returned to Supply for reconditioning and reissue. The team is currently returning 
issued equipment to supply and discovered a 30-35% loss of accountability. This loss is 
not unique; rather, is considered typical. 
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All issued TOA material is cycled back to the Material department. This is 
referred to as a reconciliation process, during which an 1149 Requisition and 
Invoice/Shipping Document is verified against their electronic data base in WASP. 
During the reconciliation process, the TOA gear goes through Expeditionary Logistics 
Overhaul (ELO). This is similar to the Integrated Logistics Overhaul (ILO) process that 
happens on board ships when they enter an overhaul period. During this process, the 
Material department identifies the gear that needs to be repaired, reconditioned, or 
replaced. EOD techs have the capability to repair and recondition TOA gear. Damaged 
material is immediately processed for either repair or replacement to get ready for the 
next deployable platoon. Any items gone missing or that are beyond repair require a 
survey document (DD form 200) and submitted to Supply for procurement. 
 
EXHIBIT 1 CENTCOM AOR 
 
 






EXHIBIT 2 EODESU COMMAND STRUCTURE (EODESU1, 2014) 
 
 
EXHIBIT 3 Sample PGI Listing (EODESU1, 2014) 
 
 
COG NSN DESCRIPT UI QTY WEIGHT( CUBE(CF) NSN EXT  ASSY EXT 
9ED 4240‐01‐361‐1319 CANISTER CHEMICAL‐BIOLOGICEA 2 0.1 0.0766 25.62 15141.42
0NC 4240‐LL‐LCX‐0109 MASK CHEMICAL‐BIOLOGICAL MEA 1 2 0.7653 600 354600
0NL 8415‐LL‐LCX‐0002 COAT CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE (CEA 2 6.56 0.7776 232.8 137584.8
0NL 8415‐LL‐LCX‐0003 TROUSERS CHEMICAL PROTECTIPR 2 7.8 2.6666 276.84 163612.4
0NL 8415‐LL‐LCX‐0004 GLOVES NUC‐BIO‐CHEM CONTAPR 2 0.9 0.0198 51.74 30578.34
0NL 8415‐LL‐LCX‐0005 GLOVES INSERTS NUC‐BIO‐CHEMPR 2 0.5 0.0182 10.98 6489.18
0NL 8430‐LL‐LCX‐0006 OVERBOOT LIGHTWEIGHT NUC‐PR 2 3.5 0.8312 71.84 42457.44
9BD 8465‐00‐860‐0256 COVER CANTEEN WATER OLIVE EA 1 0.25 0.0364 5.89 3480.99
9BD 8465‐01‐115‐0026 CANTEEN WATER PLASTIC 1QT CEA 1 0.5 0.0781 5.25 3102.75
9BD 8465‐01‐322‐1965 BELT INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT MEA 1 0 0 14.45 8539.95
9BL 8465‐01‐500‐5485 BAG NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL & CHEA 1 4 1.546 107.87 63751.17
9BL 6545‐01‐566‐4797 INDIVIDUAL MEDICAL ASSAULT EA 1 2 0.0954 224.53 132697.2
9BD 8470‐01‐534‐0777 CARRIER,SMALL ARMS PROTECTEA 2 2 0.1852 625.24 369516.8
9BW 8470‐01‐540‐6532 INSERT SMALL ARMS‐INSERT,SMEA 2 4.5 0.0554 496.72 293561.5
0NL 8470‐LL‐LCX‐0011 INSERTS ESAPI EA 2 0 0 1015 599865
0NL 8470‐LL‐LCX‐8109 MAR‐CIRAS KIT INCLUDING SOFKT 1 0 0 2300 1359300
9BL 5855‐LL‐LCC‐9024 MOUNT NVG 1HOLE G37 TAN EA 1 0 0 639.28 377814.5
9BH 6220‐01‐549‐4184 LIGHT F/HELMET (RED‐WHITE‐B EA 1 0.5 0.0065 0 0
9BD 8415‐01‐524‐5842 BAND HELMET CAMOUFLAGE (FEA 2 0 0 1.88 1111.08
0NW 8415‐LL‐LCX‐0137 COVER HELMET NAVY WORKINGEA 1 0 0 13.14 7765.74
0NW 8415‐LL‐LCX‐0138 COVER HELMET NAVY WORKINGEA 1 0 0 13.14 7765.74
9BW 8470‐LL‐LCX‐8087 HELMET, GROUND TROOPS ECHEA 1 5 0 733.65 433587.2
0NL 8125‐LL‐LCC‐4312 BOTTLE WIDE MOUTH 32OZ. LOOEA 1 0.5 0.1446 9.5 5614.5
0NL 8125‐LL‐LCC‐4319 PARK WATER BOTTLE 1 LITER DAEA 1 0.25 0.2083 20 11820
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EXHIBIT 4 Sample TOA Listing (EODESU1, 2014) 
 
 
EXHIBIT 5 Types of Gear (NKO, 2014) 
 
1) PGI: This refers to organizational clothing and equipment issued to an individual 
while checking into expeditionary command. When standard uniform items are 
deemed inadequate, PGI gear is specifically designed to provide personal 
protection during training, combat, and in hostile environments. Examples of gear 
are: Uniforms, Cold weather gear, Wet or Dry suits, etc. 
 
2) TOA: This is the listing of approved equipment and materiel required by NECC 
and NSW units to perform their missions in contingency, wartime, and disaster 
recovery operations. TOA developed is supported by three documents: Required 
Operational Capability (ROC), Projected Operational Environment (POE), and 
Navy Mission Essential Task List (NMETL). TOA listing varies based on the 
unit’s primary capabilities and mission statement. TOA is designed to support all 
unit requirements for 60 days with the exception of food and fuel—supported for 
15 days. TOA does not support ammunitions. Examples of these are: Weapons, 







EXHIBIT 6 Types IT Systems and Procurement Processes (NKO, 2014; 
EODESU1, 2014; LOGSU1, 2014) 
 
1) R-Supply: computer based system used by both EOD and NSW. It serves as their 
primary system used to manage maintenance, supplies, NSN requisitions, 
budgeting, and financial reporting. 
 
2) WASP: stand-alone commercial of the shelf inventory management software that 
is used as the primary inventory management system (EODESU). The system was 
implemented in 2010 and serves as EODESU’s primary inventory and warehouse 
management system. WASP is not part of the navy program of record and it is a 
non-networked local system that does not allow asset visibility outside the 
command. It does come with capabilities: barcode scanner, barcode labeling 
software, and basic inventory / asset tracking that allows EODESU to manage its 
inventory much more efficiently. Prior to WASP, the primary method used to 
manage inventory was MS Excel spreadsheets. 
 
3) SWALIS: developed and fielded for U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) to provide Total Asset Visibility (TAV) across the NSW enterprise. 
LOGSU uses this system to primarily manage PGI and TOA gear for NSW 
forces. SWALIS is DODAF-compliant and WLAN-capable. It allows NSW 
forces to have real-time visibility on load-out status and locations of all mission 
critical equipment. 
 
4) SPEAR: system used by NSW LOGSUs to manage body armor systems, 
protective eyewear, and Protective Combat Uniform (PCU). 
 
5) MICAS: automated system used by LOGSU to track shelf-life and inventory of 
Chemical Biological and Radiological (CBR) individual protective Equipment for 
NSW forces. It provides centralized management of CBR assets. This also means 
centralized reporting capability, increased data accuracies, and improved 
efficiencies in asset visibility and shelf-life management. 
 
6) Garrison reach-back: when deployed units are unable obtain material or 
equipment locally; they communicate their needs to the stateside Logistics 
Support Unit (LSU). LSU is capable of shipping the material worldwide using 
DHL carrier. 
 
7) GCPC: based on established spending limits, this allows authorized personnel to 
make micro-purchases to support one’s expeditionary units. 
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8) FOO/PA: FOO is an individual authorized by the contracting officer in writing to 
execute purchase using Standard Form (SF) 44. PA is an individual appointed in 
writing to pay for FOO authorized purchases with cash and other negotiable 
instruments. 
 
9) OPCON/TACON system/process: this process is determined by the specific 
military service serving as a theater operation command. For example, army uses 
Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARRS) for all of its requisition processes; 




























V. ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter analyzes the situations described in the previous case studies and 
describes the issues identified during this study’s research. Additionally, this chapter 
attempts to answer the questions faced when this research began as well as those that 
arose, as the research progressed, which seemed to be more at the heart of the issues 
probed. Finally, recommendations are made that this study’s researchers believe will 
improve the performance of the organizations studied. 
During the course of research, the existence of several factors, which unavoidably 
limited the scope of this research and reduced the confidence in the findings, was 
recognized. Principally among these was the researchers’ limited time available relative 
to the large scope of the overall project. Although this is the first report in a series that 
will make up the researchers’ ONR project, the limited time constrained this study’s 
focus to look at only two expeditionary communities—and only those two located on the 
West Coast. 
A second limitation was the limited amount of numerical data that was available. 
This lack of data was attributable to the limited time, the exploratory nature of the 
researchers’ inquiries, and in the case of NSW, the classified nature of the missions. 
Although this study’s researchers believe the findings provide significant value and 
insight, without the ability to analyze large amount of actual numerical data, it was not 
possible to definitively identify areas of improvement or quantify the potential 
improvement. Thus, the findings must be considered preliminary. 
A third factor was the choice of communities to study. Although this research 
only looked into two commands and, given the risks of making judgments based on a 
sample size of two, the researchers believe that between NSW and EOD, EOD is the 
more representative example of a typical expeditionary command and the challenges it 
faces will be more common to the remainder of the NECC subcommands. This is 
because, as one interviewee stated “NSW is Navy in name only.” Because of the high 
profile and strategic nature of the missions with which they are tasked, they are given 
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much higher priority and greater resources than the commands of NECC. The missions of 
the EOD and NSW forces are similar in many aspects and are often complimentary when 
deployed in the field to achieve a common goal. They are, however, very different in 
other aspects and this makes the comparison between the two difficult. Besides the nature 
of their respective missions, the nature of the commands and supporting organizations 
makes a direct comparison between the two somewhat difficult. NSW is a small 
organization with high profile and high priority missions. Consequently, it is given more 
resources than other expeditionary commands and comparing it to EOD may not yield 
practicable insights. To help mitigate the impact of these limitations, a discussion follows 
that will present the ways in which the researchers believe they affected the findings. 
Recommendations for further research will also be presented. 
A. ANALYSIS 
During the course of this study’s research, a number of areas that offered the 
possibility of improved financial and operational efficiency were identified. When 
considering the nature of these opportunities and the circumstances that brought them 
about, it became apparent to the team that several key factors were at work. First among 
these was the size of the NSW and EOD community (approximately 10,500 personnel 
(EOD, 2012; USSOCOM, 2012) relative to the size of traditional Navy (approximately 
310,000 personnel). Because the expeditionary community makes up a relatively small 
portion of the Navy in terms of both manning and the number of mission sets to which it 
contributes, it is likely that the community’s requirements are necessarily assigned lower 
priority than those of the maritime force. The Navy must make choices regarding how it 
will spend its resources and, like any other organization, it will seek to obtain the most 
satisfaction from its large, but nevertheless finite resources. Consequently, it is plausible 
that an organization the size of the Navy would be unable to completely meet the needs 
of a minority of stakeholder organizations like EOD. 
Another factor that contributes to the inefficiencies observed in the case of EOD 
is the diverse nature of the commands which make up NECC and their relative sizes. 
NECC is composed of ten separate commands with SEABEEs claiming more than half of 
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NECC’s personnel. Although the team was unable to determine if this is true in other 
areas, indications were received to show that at least on the West coast, this has resulted 
in the SEABEE culture dominating the NECC community and its requirements being 
given de facto higher priority. 
1. Information Technology (IT) Systems 
As previously mentioned, NECC makes up a small portion of the Navy’s overall 
manning. Of this population, EOD personnel are a vanishingly small fraction. 
Consequently, they are unable to claim funding that would permit them to have a written 
contract tailored with an inventory management program to meet their needs. As a result, 
EOD “makes do” with the systems it has: the commonly available commercial products 
such as WASP for inventory management and navy-approved systems such as R-supply 
for financial management. WASP was only implemented as an inventory management 
system less than three years ago. It is an improvement over their previous methods of 
using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. The use of multiple systems to perform inventory 
management results in an ad hoc inventory management system that requires double 
entries to maintain duplicate databases, as well as extensive, lengthy periods of on-the-
job training to master the systems. Likewise, the logistics operations of the NSW 
community suffer from inefficiencies that also stem from a variety of computer systems 
required to conduct its business. Multiple systems are required to maintain equipment 
inventories and specific programs are required to be used for certain categories of 
equipment. Moreover, none of the databases for these inventory management programs 
are able to share information with the software used to track finances (R-Supply). 
The effect this is having on NSW and EOD logistics operations is reduced 
efficiency and effectiveness. For a typical Logistics Specialist, a tour in an expeditionary 
unit is unusual. The requirement to use multiple computer systems negates a key benefit 
of computer technology by multiplying the work required by the user. The need to 
perform repetitive data entries is an invitation for natural human error. These inevitable 
errors also introduce inaccuracies into the inventory, contribute to a loss of 
accountability, and reduce buying power for the taxpayer. 
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Most who serve in such a unit do so for only one tour and the majority can spend 
an entire career on sea-going ships. As a result, the systems LS can expect to encounter in 
an expeditionary command will be extremely unfamiliar. These programs have no formal 
Navy training available and the Sailor must learn through on-the-job training for up to 18 
months. The USMC, however, utilizes logistics programs along with the associated 
schools. We recommend further research be conducted to determine if these programs 
and schools could be adapted for use by Navy. 
2. Procurement Methods 
This study showed that similar procurement methods are used to appropriate 
materiels and gear within the LOGSU and EODESU. Both rely heavily on open 
purchases using contracts or government credit card through the commercial sources. The 
goal is to have the gear fixed or replaced through the fastest means possible. Relying on 
the readily available product allows them to procure and stay current with technology 
advancement at a much faster rate in an effort to always stay ahead of the next potential 
threat. 
a. Contracting Support 
There is a wide discrepancy in the apparent contracting assistance available to 
NSW and EOD communities. NSW possess an organic ability to write and administer 
contracts. This greatly increases the speed with which equipment and services can be 
obtained while reducing the workload on the unit’s logisticians. In contrast, EOD is 
required to use the contracting services of the Fleet Logistics Center (FLC). This 
increases delays and administrative workload. This study’s team recommends conducting 
further research to explore methods that could give other expeditionary units contracting 
abilities more comparable to those of NSW. 
b. Reliance on Commercial Equipment and Government Purchase Card 
There is a demand for cutting-edge equipment among members of the NSW and 
EOD communities. This compels their logistics support units to rely heavily on the use of 
their government purchase card (GPC.) The Navy’s supply system is best suited to 
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providing parts and equipment to traditional ships and submarines. Relative to NSW and 
EOD, these platforms face threats and challenges that change slowly and, consequently, 
their equipment is similarly slow to change. This is not the case with expeditionary units. 
They operate in a more dynamic environment. While a ship may have a service life of up 
to 50 years, much of the equipment used by EOD and NSW has a service life of only 
months. This timeframe does not permit economical parts support. Incorporating this into 
the traditional maintenance model of a sea-going ship could be meaningful. The GPC 
permits these commands to obtain the required equipment quickly, but this does not come 
without consequence. The process of purchasing with Government Purchase Card records 
purchases information in a form that is not readily accessible to external organizations. 
For example, the total dollar amount spent on a purchase is recorded in one system; 
however, purchased items get recorded individually into a different system.  The two 
systems are not compatible.  The amount spent and the list of items on that purchase can 
only be reconciled manually by reviewing the original receipt.  As a result, demand 
history is lost along with the ability to easily audit expenditures. This study’s team 
recommends that research be performed to develop systems or methods that would enable 
the information about purchased items to be more readily and centrally available. 
c. Difficulty Maintaining Accountability for Equipment 
The process used to issue and maintain accountability of equipment is inadequate, 
particularly during a unit’s deployment. Based on the preliminary information available 
at the time of this research and the interviews of subject matter experts, this study’s 
researchers estimated that loss of material accountability is approximately 70% for NSW 
and 35% for EOD. This is attributable to the methods used to assign and record 
accountability for equipment, the relative ease with which equipment can be replaced, 
and the inability to detect trends in purchases and/or surveys. 
Prior to deployment, accountability for the equipment is assigned to an individual 
or team using a paper DD form 1149. During the NSW or EOD deployment, no supply or 
logistics personnel from the team’s unit are deployed with them to provide support to 
deployed equipment and, as a result, the responsibility for maintaining custody falls to 
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the Combat Service Support team (CSS) in theatre. The CSS is required to do these using 
suboptimal methods such as Excel spreadsheets or a locally maintained database. It 
should be noted that even when the database is a familiar program, if the unit is being 
deployed with another service, the unit will be required to use that service’s program. 
This introduces inefficiencies and reduces effectiveness in a manner similar to that 
previously described. 
While deployed, the teams’ focus understandably shifts to the successful 
accomplishment of the mission. Equipment, however, can be damaged or lost and 
replacements are obtained from respective in-theater logistics support units to ensure 
maximum readiness. This use of locally deployed support personnel helps the team 
maintain its capability to accomplish assigned tasks. It is likely, however, that by 
separating the functions that maintain accountability from the equipment, a culture in 
which material costs are not a major concern could be created. 
The paper DD 1149 records are maintained at the team’s homeport and are unable 
to be updated when equipment is lost/destroyed and subsequently replaced. Additionally, 
because gear that is deployed with a unit is by definition “mission essential,” replacing it 
is a high priority. Consequently, a given piece of equipment may be replaced several 
times during a deployment, but it is only upon the team’s return to home port that its 
equipment and equipment inventory records are reconciled. Some gear is deployed and 
returns with an individual Sailor or unit and discrepancies will be detected after the six-
month deployment is concluded. As described previously, however, because these 
purchases are likely to have been made using a GPC, the record of any replacements 
purchased during this time is largely obscured. 
Additionally, a significant amount of equipment will only be reconciled after 18 
months or may never be reconciled at all. Certain pieces of equipment are too costly to 
warrant purchasing in quantities sufficient to provide to each unit or too large to 
economically deploy and redeploy with a designated unit. This equipment is designated 
RIP/TOA and is turned over in theatre as units are relieved. Although this equipment may 
have a high value, because it may be more than a year since accountability was first 
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assigned and procuring replacements for deployed equipment is relatively easy, this 
equipment may never be reconciled but simply “written off.” 
Because the method required to document and track equipment loss/damage relies 
upon hard copy paper documentation, it is likely that there is no effective means to 
accurately determine the cause of the loss/damage. Also, because of the nature of the 
control systems in place and the culture and attitudes it may engender, it is also unlikely 
that individuals with assigned accountability will be held accountable in the event of loss 
or damaged equipment. Lost, destroyed, and unserviceable equipment is properly 
recorded using the DD form 200. These forms, however, are produced at a rapid rate and 
the logistics units require several large binders to maintain a record of these forms. The 
documentation process is methodical. It is likely, however, that the sheer volume of 
paperwork makes it very difficult to assure accuracy in individual cases and to discern 
long-term patterns. Instead, the skill and memories of the unit’s leaders and Sailors 
become the primary means for detecting trends. The reliance on paper forms and the 
volume with which they are produced places a significant administrative burden on the 
NSW and EOD logistics support commands while simultaneously obscuring trends in the 
information these forms record. It is probable that these factors make it unlikely that an 
individual Sailor will suffer any consequences in the event of a loss of accountability. 
This is because the same factors also make it difficult to detect a loss due to negligence or 
theft. The systems may also create the perception that the forms are a “paperwork drill.” 
With this perception, it is likely Sailors prioritize their core responsibilities above any 
fiduciary accountability they may be assigned. In such an environment, it would also be 
inappropriate to punish the Sailor for responding to the incentives which he has been 
given. 
This study’s researchers recommend further study be performed to ascertain the 
attitudes of Sailors in the EOD and NSW commands and assess the culture of these 
organizations with regard to material accountability and the IT systems used to manage it. 
This study also recommends further research into the feasibility of developing and 
implementing a computer-based accountability system. This could reduce the 
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administrative burdens of the current paperwork systems while enhancing the ability to 
maintain accurate records of equipment. 
B. CONCLUSION 
While the research conducted has been necessarily limited in scope, we believe it 
clearly suggested there may be significant opportunities to realize increased cost savings 
across the expeditionary communities. The preliminary natures of our inquiries indicate 
cause for further study to validate our assessment and conclusions. Additionally, our 
inquiries relied principally upon the interviews of experts currently working in the field 
and that provided a valuable starting point from which to begin our research. Further 
research, however, should endeavor to gather and analyze more quantifiable data. We 
believe the implementation of a Lean Six Sigma analysis of various aspects of the project 
regarding the use of computer systems, paperwork records, and the use of manpower, 
etc., has the potential to yield significant results in the enhancement of the understanding 
of these processes, the potential benefits available to be gained, and the possible methods 
to realize them. Regardless of the questions remaining to be answered, it’s clear that this 
analysis is worthwhile and will provide valuable contribution to reducing the burden the 
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